Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel Vs. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra and Ors.

Facts

This appeal challenges the Gujarat High Court's judgment convicting the appellant under Section 36 read with Section 8 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1964 (the Act).

The case arose from a complaint by an Inspector of the Godhra Agricultural Produce Market Committee, alleging that the appellant purchased ginger in January and February 1969 without the required license under the Act. While the Magistrate acknowledged the purchase, he acquitted the appellant, citing the lack of evidence that the relevant notification regarding ginger was properly promulgated and published as required by law.

The trial was conducted summarily, and the High Court later imposed a token fine. Although seemingly minor, the case raises important legal questions overlooked at earlier stages. The High Court's decision rested on an incorrect assumption, and critical issues were not adequately addressed during the proceedings.

Key Takeaways for Students

Legal Issue

Whether the notification issued under Section 6(5) of the Act, covering additional varieties of agricultural produce like ginger and onion, must not only be published in the official gazette but must also be published in Gujarati in a newspaper?

Holding

The Court observed that Notification issued under Section 6(5) of the Act, like that under Section 6(1), must also be published in Gujarati in a newspaper having circulation in the particular area. This requirement is mandatory and must be fulfilled. The notification issued under Section 6(5) on February 16, 1968 was not published in a newspaper at all, much less in Gujarati. Accordingly, the inclusion of new varieties of agricultural produce in that notification lacks legal validity and no prosecution can be founded upon its breach.

Rule 3 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1965 relates specifically and exclusively to notifications "issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 5 or under Sub-section (1) of Section 6". As we are concerned with a notification issued under Sub-section (5) of Section 6, we need not go into the question whether Rule 3 is complied with. We may however indicate that the authorities concerned must comply with Rule 3 also in regard to notifications j issued under Sections 5(1) and 6(1) of the Act. After all, the rule is calculated to cause no inconvenience to the authorities charged with the duty of administering the Act. It only requires publication by affixing a copy of the notification at some conspicuous place in the office of each of the local authorities functioning in the area specified in the notification.

The prosecution was conducted before the learned Magistrate in an indifferent manner. That is not surprising because the beneficent purpose of summary trials is almost al ways defeated by a summary approach. Bhailalbhai Chaturbhai Patel, an Inspector in the Godhra Agricultural Produce Market Committee, who was a material witness for proving the offence, said in his evidence that he did not know whether or not the notifications were published in any newspaper or on the notice board of the Godhra Municipality. The learned Magistrate acquitted the appellant holding that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the notifications were published and promulgated as required by law.

The Gujarat High Court's judgment began with an incorrect statement that Ex. 9, dated April 19, 1962, was a notification constituting the Godhra Market area. In reality, Ex. 9 declared certain areas as the "market proper" under a different provision of the Bombay Act. The relevant notification was Ex. 10, dated February 16, 1968, which added new produce, including ginger, to the market's scope under Section 6(5) of the Gujarat Act.

The High Court overturned the acquittal by relying on a prior judgment by A.D. Desai, J., related to the Bombay Act, which dealt with whether Section 4(1) of that Act was mandatory or directory. However, this case involved Section 6(5) of the Gujarat Act, which differs significantly from the Bombay Act. The High Court neither referred to nor appeared to consider these distinctions, assuming the matter was resolved by the earlier judgment, which was inapplicable to the current case.

Judgment of the High Court set aside.

Final Decision Appeal allowed